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United States v. Newman (1981)
E. Jacques Courtois, Jr. was a member of the merger and acquisition
department of Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. (Morgan).' Adrian Antoniu
held a comparable position with Kuhn, Loeb & Co. (Kuhn Loeb). 2 As a
result of their positions, Courtois and Antoniu acquired confidential,
nonpublic information concerning possible mergers, acquisitions, tender
offers, and other takeover bids for various target companies. 3 It was
alleged that they misappropriated certain of this information and communicated it to co-conspirators James Newman, Franklin Carniol, and
Constantine Spyropoulos. 4 The latter, using methods designed to conceal their activities, purchased shares of companies that were merger and
takeover targets of the clients of Morgan and Kuhn Loeb. 5 When the
proposed takeovers became known to the public and the target companies' stocks increased in value, the co-conspirators sold the stocks,
reaped substantial gains, and divided the profits among all of the parties
involved. 6
The Government indicted Newman and his co-conspirators 7 for
1. United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,024, at 91,288 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Morgan is an investment banking
firm which represents companies engaged in corporate mergers, acquisitions,
tender offers, and other takeovers. Id. On July 1, 1977 Courtois was made
vice-president of Morgan's merger and acquisition department. Id.
2. Id. From 1972 to 1975 Antoniu was employed by Morgan, but in 1975
he left Morgan and went to work for Kuhn Loeb, another investment banking
firm. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1981).

Kuhn Loeb

merged with another firm and is now known as Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb
Inc. Id.
98,024, at 91,288.
3. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
4. Id. This information was conveyed surreptitiously to Newman, who
was a securities trader and manager of the over-the-counter trading department
of a New York brokerage firm. 664 F.2d at 15. Newman then passed this information to Carniol, a resident of Belgium, and Spyropoulos, a Greek citizen
who lived in both Greece and France. Id.
98,024, at 91,288.
5. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
In order to avoid detection, the co-conspirators used secret foreign bank and
trust accounts, and spread their purchases among brokers. 664 F.2d at 15.
6. 664 F.2d at 15.
98,024, at 91,288.
7. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
The indictment also charged Courtois, Carniol, and Spyropoulos, but only
Newman was within the jurisdiction of the district court and made a party to
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securities fraud,8 under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 9 and SEC Rule 1Ob-5 promulgated thereunder. 10 The district
court dismissed the indictment against Newman because there was no
clear and definite statement in the federal securities laws which both
antedated and proscribed the acts alleged in the indictment which would
have given the defendant reasonable notice that his conduct was prohibited."' The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
the proceedings. 664 F.2d at 15. The other defendants had left the United
States and, as of the date of the proceedings in the district court, the Government had been unsuccessful in extraditing them for arraignment. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,024, at 91,287 n.l.
98,024, at 91,288.
8. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
The indictment also charged the defendants with mail fraud and conspiracy to
commit mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1341 (1976). [1981 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,024, at 91,287-88.
9. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
98,024, at 91,287.
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976). See text accompanying note 18 infra.
10. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
98,024, at 91,287.
Rule lob-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). For a discussion of the purpose of rule lob-5,
see note 19 infra.
11. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
98,024, at 91,296.
In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that at the time of its decision,
neither the courts nor the SEC had extended rule lob-5 to a non-insider's
breach of a fiduciary duty owed to an acquiring corporation in a tender offer
situation. This defendant, therefore, was not given a reasonable opportunity
to know that his conduct was prohibited. Id. The court noted that although
the SEC is concerned generally with the regulation of tender offers, the conduct
prosecuted here was not proscribed by the SEC until 1980, when rule 14e- was
promulgated. Id. For a discussion of rule 14e-3 and its effect, see notes 57-60
and accompanying text infra.
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reversed and remanded, holding that Newman's conduct, as alleged in
the indictment, operated as a fraud on Morgan, Kuhn Loeb, and their
clients in connection with the purchase of securities of the target companies, 12 and therefore, could be found to constitute a criminal violation of rule 10b-5. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
The purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 18 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 14 is "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure
for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus ...

achieve a high standard

of ethics in the securities industry." 15 The reasoning behind promoting full disclosure is that investors are less likely to fall prey to fraudulent schemes if they have complete information concerning the companies in whose stock they are trading. 16 Further, Congress enacted
many antifraud provisions in an attempt to protect the market place
from fraudulent activities and thereby bolster investor confidence in the
7
United States securities market.'
The district court also dismissed the mail fraud charge because the allegations failed as a matter of law to charge a crime. [1981 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,024, at 91,301. Consequently, once the substantive counts were dismissed, the district court held that the conspiracy count
must similarly be dismissed. Id.
12. 664 F.2d at 16. The Second Circuit also held that the defendants
violated the mail fraud statute. Id. at 19. Consequently, the Second Circuit
held that the reinstatement of the substantive counts required the reinstatement
of the conspiracy charge. Id. at 20.
13. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
14. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1976).
15. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972),
quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). See
Note, Securities Exchange Act of 1934-Restrictive Application of Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 in Securities Fraud, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 474, 478
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Restrictive Application of Section 10(b)]. See also
Gadsby, Historical Development of the S.E.C.-The Government View, 28
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 6 (1959); Moore 8 Wiseman, Market Manipulation and
the Exchange Act, 2 U. CH. L. REV. 46 (1934).
16. Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-lOB-5: An Emerging Remedy for
Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1120-21 (1950), citing H.R. REP. No.
1.383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-7, 13 and passim (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1934).
17. See Note, Rule 10b-5 and the Trading Fairness Doctrine, 26 WAYNE
L. REV. 193, 196 (1979).
The antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 include:
§ 11, which permits buyer recovery if a prospectus contained a misstatement or material omission; § 12(1), which allows the buyer to sue
the seller if the buyer was not given a prospectus or if the security
was not registered; § 12(2), which gives the buyer a cause of action if
the seller misrepresented material facts in the sale; § 17(a), which is
the forebearer of rule lob-5 and makes it unlawful for any person to
perpetrate a fraud or material misrepresentation during the sale of
any security.
The Exchange Act of 1934 added § 9(e), which permits a buyer
or seller to sue anyone who has willfully engaged in manipulative
activities in relation to any security registered on an exchange; § 18(a),
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Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, an antifraud provision, prohibits any
"manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in contravention of
any rule promulgated by the SEC "for the protection of investors." 1s
In 1942, pursuant to this power, the SEC adopted rule lOb-5 19 which
proscribes the use of "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . in

connection with the purchase or sale of any security."

20

Although the

which allows a cause of action for a buyer or seller against anyone
who made a false or misleading statement in any official papers filed
under the Act; § 16(b), which allows any shareholder to recover for
the corporation any profits earned by an insider through any purchase
and sale or sale and purchase of securities that took place within a
six-month period.
Id. at 196-97 n.19.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). For the text of § 10(b), see note 9 supra.
19. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1981). For the text of rule lOb-5, see note 10
supra. The 1933 Act dealt primarily with the issuance of new securities, and
therefore, its provisions were to protect the defrauded buyer and not the
defrauded seller. See Note, supra note 16, at 1127. Although the 1934 Act
dealt more evenhandedly with the buyer and seller, it supplied remedies only
for specialized types of unfair conduct. Id. at 1128. Section 9(e) permits a
buyer or seller to sue any person who has wilfully engaged in manipulative
activities, and Section 18(a) gives buyers and sellers a cause of action against
those who have made false and misleading statements in any document filed
under the Act. Id. Finally, in 1936 some protection was given to sellers when
Section 15(c) was added to the 1934 Act. Section 15(c) prohibited fraud or
misrepresentation in contravention of SEC rules in the purchase as well as the
sale of securities. Id. at 1129-30. However, the problem with this section was
that it applied only to transactions not taking place on an exchange, and only
to brokers and dealers. Id. at 1130. Thus, a sizeable gap still remained in
the securities laws dealing with fraud in the purchase of securities by persons
other than brokers and dealers, and fraud in the purchase of securities effected
on a national exchange. Id. In 1942 the SEC adopted rule lob-5 in order to
fill this perceived gap in the securities laws by supplying defrauded sellers with
remedies already available to defrauded buyers under other provisions of the
Act. Id. at 1138. See Note, Cause of Action Is Asserted Under Rule 1Ob-5
Where Minority Shareholder Alleges a Material Nondisclosure by Defendants
That Deprived Him of a State Injunctive Remedy Against a Merger, 26 VILL.
L. REV. 777, 781 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Material Nondisclosure]; Note,
supra note 17, at 197-98.
20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. For the text of rule lOb-5, see note 10 supra.
In determining whether a 10b-5 violation has occurred, many courts have
struggled to define the requirement of the existence of a device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud, and the requirement that the purchase or sale of securities
take place in connection with the alleged fraud. Material Nondisclosure,
supra note 19, at 780. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6 (1971). In Bankers Life, Manhattan Casualty Company's sole stockholder, Bankers Life & Casualty Co., agreed to sell all of its Manhattan stock
to one Begole for $5,000,000. Id. at 7. Begole conspired with others to
purchase this stock with Manhattan's own assets. Id. This was accomplished
by installing a cohort as president of Manhattan and then having Manhattan
sell a significant portfolio of United States Treasury bonds. Id. at 8. The
proceeds from the sale of the bonds were appropriated by Begole and used to
pay for the Manhattan stock. Id. The Court stated that "[t]he crux of the
present case is that Manhattan suffered an injury as a result of deceptive
practices touching its sale of securities as an investor." Id. at 12-13 (emphasis
added).
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provisions of rule 1Ob-5 have been described as catch-all provisions, 2 '
they apply only where there is fraud.2 2 The Supreme Court has stated
that when an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can
be no fraud absent a duty to speak.2 8 Therefore, the crucial question
The Second Circuit interpreted the broad language of Bankers Life in
Competitive Assoc., Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516
F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1975). Competitive Associates retained Yamada and his
company-Takara Corporation-as portfolio managers after having examined
allegedly false financial statements of the Takara Corporation, which had been
prepared by the defendant accounting firm. Id. at 812. Competitive Associates
averred that they suffered substantial losses resulting from purchases and sales
of securities made by Yamada. Id. The court held that the auditing and
certification activities of the defendant were conducted in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security, and therefore, were within rule lob-5. Id. at 815.
See Cox, Fraud Is In The Eyes of The Beholder: Rule lOb-5's Application To
Acts of Corporate Mismanagement, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 674 (1972).
The Third Circuit had occasion to interpret the language of Bankers Life
in Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940
(1977). The Ketchum court held that the complaint failed to allege a fraud
which was rendered "in connection with" the purchase or sale of a security.
The allegation had been that the defendants failed to disclose a plan to remove
the plaintiffs from their offices in the corporation, which plan set in operation
a chain of events that culminated in the forced sale of the plaintiffs' shares of
stock in the corporation. Id. at 1027. See Note, Fraudulent Activity Must
Occur "In Connection With" Purchase or Sale of Securities to Violate Section
10(b), 23 VILL. L. REv. 846 (1977-78).
21. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976). The legislative history of § 10(b) indicates that it is a "catchall" clause to "deal with
new manipulative or cunning devices." Id. Thomas G. Corcoran, a spokesman for the drafters of the 1934 Act indicated:
Subsection (c) [§ 9(c) of H.R. 7852-later § 10(b)] says, 'Thou shalt
not devise any other cunning devices'. . . . Of course subsection (c)
is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices. I do not think
there is any objection to that kind of clause. The Commission
should have the authority to deal with new manipulative devices.
Id. at 202-03, quoting Stock Exchange Regulation, Hearings on H.R. 7852 and
H.R. 8720 Before House Comm. on Internal and Foreign Commerce, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934).
22. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980). Under
the common-law the elements of the tort cause of action for fraud or deceit
are: 1) a false representation; 2) knowledge or belief on the part of the
defendant that the representation is false, or, that he has an insufficient basis
of information to make it; 3) an intention to induce the plaintiff to act or
to refrain from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation; 4) justifiable
reliance upon the representation on the part of the plaintiff; and 5) damage
to the plaintiff, resulting from such reliance. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 106 (4th ed. 1965).
23. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980). See also NV.
PROSSER, supra note 22, at § 106. A difficult problem arises as to whether mere
silence can serve as the foundation of a deceit action. Id. The general rule
at common-law is that an action will not lie for tacit nondisclosure. Id.
However, an exception is found where the parties stand in some confidential
or fiduciary relation to one another, such as principal and agent, executor and
beneficiary of an estate, bank and investing depositor, or majority and
minority stockholders. Id. Hence, a tort action for deceit may be brought
where the parties are in a fiduciary relationship, because in that situation the
parties are under a duty to disclose all material facts. Id.
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for the courts to determine in nondisclosure cases is when the duty to
24
speak arises.
The early cases interpreting rule 1Ob-5 utilized the principles of
common-law fraud, finding that the duty to disclose could be triggered
by a relationship of trust and confidence. 25 These courts required a
fiduciary duty to disclose before liability would be imposed under 1Ob-5
for mere silence. 26
A shift in the scope of liability under rule lOb-5 began with the
decision in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.," where the SEC extended the
duty to disclose to a tippee of a corporate fiduciary. 28 In Cady, Roberts,
a director of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation told a partner in Cady,
Roberts, a broker-dealer firm, that Curtiss-Wright had reduced their
24. See Restrictive Application of Section 10(b), supra note 15, at 479-80.
25. See, e.g., James Blackstone Mem. Library Ass'n v. Gulf M. & 0. R.R.,
264 F.2d 445, 450 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959); Trussell v.
United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 762 (D. Colo. 1964); Connelly v.
Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 56 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd per curiam, 279 F.2d 685
(6th Cir. 1960); Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F.
Supp. 323, 327-28 (D. Del. 1956), af'd, 224 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1957); Mills v.

Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 764-65 (D.N.J. 1955). See generally Jennings,

Insider Trading In Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and Disclosure
Obligations Under Rule lOb-5, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 809, 815-16 (1968); Note,
Absent An Affirmative Duty to Disclose, Criminal Liability for Nondisclosure
Under Rule 10b-5 Will Not Be Found, 3 WHITTIER L. REV. 129, 133 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Affirmative Duty To Disclose]. But see Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951). In Speed, a majority stockholder was found liable under rule lob-5 for purchasing shares from minority
stockholders without the disclosure of nonpublic facts to which the majority
stockholder had access to by virtue of its position. Id. at 828-29. Although the
court held that a majority shareholder has a duty to inform the minority shareholders of information it acquired, concerning the fact that their corporation's
assets were grossly undervalued, the court stated that its decision was not based
on the common-law notion of a fiduciary relation, but rather on notions of
fairness. Id. at 829. The court stated:
The duty of disclosure stems from the necessity of preventing a corporate insider from utilizing his position to take unfair advantage of
the uninformed minority stockholders. It is an attempt to provide a
degree of equalization of bargaining position in order that the minority may exercise an informed judgment in any such transaction.
Id. See generally Note, Rule lOb-5 and the Duty to Disclose Market Information: It Takes A Thief, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 93, 103 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as It Takes A Thief].
26. See, e.g., Trussell v. United States Underwriters, Ltd., 288 F. Supp. 757,
762 (D. Colo. 1964); Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 56 (N.D. Ohio
1959), aff'd per curiam, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960). See also Note, SEC
Action Against Fraudulent Purchasersand Sellers, 59 HARV. L. REV. 769, 773-74
(1946); Note, Purchaser's Duty to Disclose Under Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule X-JOB-5, 40 MINN. L. REV. 62, 64-65 (1955); note 23 and
accompanying text supra.
27. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
28. Id. at 912.

See It Takes A Thief, supra note 25, at 104.
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dividend.29 Acting on this information, the broker sold large numbers
of Curtiss-Wright securities 30 before the news of the dividend cut
31
reached the exchange.
The SEC held that the broker violated section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
by failing to disclose the company's plan to reduce dividends prior to
trading.3 2 In reaching this conclusion, the SEC noted that the antifraud
provisions are phrased in terms of "any person" 83 and, therefore, although it is clear that an obligation is required of corporate insidersofficers, directors, and controlling shareholders-these groups are not the
only persons subject to the obligation.34 The Commission stated that
the duty to disclose rests on two principal elements:
[F]irst, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone,
and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes
advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to
those with whom he is dealing.5
29. 40 S.E.C. at 909. At approximately 11:00 a.m., the board of directors
of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation authorized the transmission to the New
York Stock Exchange of their decision to reduce their dividend. Id. There
was a short delay in the transmission of the telegram due to technical problems,
and the message was not received by the exchange until 12:29 p.m. Id. During this interval, J. Cheever Cowdin, a Curtiss-Wright director, called Robert
M. Gintel, the selling broker at Cady, Roberts, to inform him that the dividend
had been cut. Id.

30. Id. Upon the receipt of Cowdin's message, Gintel, the selling broker,
entered two sell orders for execution on the exchange, one to sell 2,000 shares

of Curtiss-Wright stock for ten accounts, and the other to sell-short 5,000 shares
for eleven accounts. Id.
31. Id. at 909-10. The sell orders were executed at 11:15 and 11:18 a.m.
on November 25 at 401 and 403 respectively. Id. at 909. The announcement did not appear on the Dow Jones ticker tape until 11:48 a.m. on that
day. Id. at 909-10. At that time, the exchange suspended trading of CurtissWright stock due to the large number of sell orders. Id. When trading resumed two hours later, the stock was trading at 36 , and closed at 347.
Id.
at 910.
32. Id. at 911. For the text of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5, see notes 9 & 10
supra. The failure of Gintel to make a disclosure of material facts known to
him violated these antifraud provisions. Id. The defrauded parties were the
purchasers of the Curtiss-Wright stock, and there was, therefore, a fraud in
connection with the purchase of a security in violation of rule lOb-5. Id.
The SEC similarly found that the registrant-Cady, Roberts &: Co.-violated
rule lob-5 since the actions of Gintel, a member of the registrant acting in the
course of his employment, are regarded as the acts of the registrant itself. Id.
See also In re H. F. Schroeder & Co., 27 S.E.C. 833 (1948).
33. 40 S.E.C. at 912. For the text of rule lOb-5, see note 10 supra.
34. 40 S.E.C. at 912. The SEC noted that since rule lOb-5 is phrased in
terms of "any person", it seems clear that corporate insiders do not exhaust the
class of persons upon whom the obligation of disclosure rests. Id.
35. Id. Therefore, in Cady, Roberts, the SEC made a significant departure
from securities cases following common-law principles of fraud by adopting an
"access test" where any person could be deemed to have disclosure obligations
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The expansion of the scope of rule 1Ob-5 liability which began in
Cady, Roberts culminated with the landmark decision by the Second
Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.36 In Texas Gulf Sulphur,
officers, directors, and employees of Texas Gulf Sulphur purchased stock
in their corporation without disclosing facts concerning a recent discovery of copper ore to the sellers of the corporation's securities.8 7 The
court held that the defendants had violated rule 10b-5 since their failure
to disclose amounted to a fraud in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security.3 8 In reaching this conclusion, the court used broad language stating that the duty to disclose arose not because of any special
relationship between the parties, but, rather, merely because the defendants had "possession" of material inside information. 9 Although
of an insider because of a special relationship which gives him access to inside

information. Note, One with Regular Access to Market Information Violates
Rule lob-5 when Trading in Securities Without Disclosing that Information,
10 SETON HALL L. REV. 720, 729-30 (1980).
36. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
For a thorough discussion of Texas Gulf Sulphur, see Bromberg, Corporate
Information: Texas Gulf Sulphur and Its Implications, 22 Sw. L.J. 731 (1968);
Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceedings, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271 (1965);
Leavell, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Opinion in the Appellate Court: An Open
Door to Federal Control of Corporations,3 GA. L. REV. 141 (1968).
37. Id. at 847. In March of 1959, aerial geophysical surveys were conducted in Eastern Canada by a group led by a vice-president of Texas Gulf
Sulphur Company (TGS). Id. at 843. These operations revealed unusual
variations in the conductivity of the rock beneath the surface, and as a result,
ground explorations were begun in October 1963. Id. Drilling samples indicated extensive mineralization, and TGS's president ordered that the results
be kept secret, even as to other officers, directors, and employees of TGS. Id.
Despite this order, rumors began to circulate, several months after the initial
drilling, that TGS had discovered a rich mineral deposit, and in response,
TGS issued a press release stating that the drillings had been inconclusive.
Id. at 844-45. Four days after the press release, TGS announced the discovery
of at least twenty-five million tons of ore. Id. at 846. Between the time of
the initial drilling and the announcement by TGS, the individual defendants
or their tippees purchased shares or calls totaling 23,360 shares of TGS stock.
Id. at 847.
The individual defendants were charged with: 1)the purchase, personally
or through agents, of TGS stock or call options on the basis of material inside
information while such information remained undisclosed to the public or to

the particular sellers; 2) the divulging of information to others for use in

purchasing TGS stock or the recommendation of its purchase while the information was undisclosed to the public or to the particular sellers; 3) the

acceptance of options to purchase TGS stock without disclosing the material
information to either the Stock Option Committee or the TGS Board of
Directors. Id. at 839-42. TGS, itself, was charged with a violation of rule
lOb-5 by the issuance of a deceptive press release. Id. at 842.

38. Id. at 842-43.

The defendants, who purchased stock or call options

from the time of the initial drilling to the announcement by TGS, were held
to have violated rule lOb-5. Id. at 842. For the text of rule lOb-5, see note 10
supra.
39. Id. at 848. The court noted that the essence of rule 10b-5 is that anyone who trades for his own benefit in the securities of a corporation who has
"access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for
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the court's analysis lessened the importance of having a relationship
between the recipient of the material information and the issuer of the
securities, the impact of this broad test may be limited by the fact that
in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the defendants did maintain a relationship with
the issuer. 40 Therefore, following the Texas Gulf Sulphur decision, it
was still unclear whether a fiduciary relationship was necessary to trigger
41
the duty to disclose.
In 1980, the Supreme Court took steps to narrow the scope of liaa corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone" may not take
advantage of such information. Id., quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). In addition, the court stated that insiders, such as
directors and officers, are clearly within this rule, but further cautioned that
rule lOb-5 is applicable to anyone who possesses material inside information,
regardless of whether they are an insider in the strict sense. Id. at 848. The
Second Circuit then articulated a new standard in determining the applicability
of rule lOb-5 with regard to nondisclosure:
[A]nyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it
in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so,
must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed.
Id. Thus, the court established a broader test than the "access" test developed
in Cady, Roberts. See note 35 and accompanying text supra; It Takes A
Thief, supra note 25, at 108.
40. 401 F.2d at 839. The defendants in Texas Gulf Sulphur included Texas
Gulf Sulphur and several of its officers, directors and employees. Id. Therefore, because the individual defendants were technically corporate insiders, the
court's statement that anyone in the possession of material inside information is
precluded from trading without disclosing the information was broader than
necessary. See, e.g., Note, A Market Insider Analysis of Liability Under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1103, 1113 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Insider Analysis]; It Takes A Thief, supra note 25, at 108;
Affirmative Duty to Disclose, supra note 25, at 136-37.

41. See Insider Analysis, supra note 40, at 1113. Shortly after the Texas
Gulf Sulphur decision, several cases were decided which set back the development of rule lOb-5 by refusing to fix liability unless a fiduciary duty could be
found. See, e.g., SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969); General Time Corp. v. Talley
Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
But see Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969),

cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); In re Investors Management Co., Inc., 44
S.E.C. 633 (1971).
In Investors Management, the Commission rejected the
contention that no violation could be found unless it was shown that the
recipient of the information occupied a special relationship with the issuer or
insider corporate source. Id. at 643-44. The Commission held that:
one who obtains possession of material, nonpublic corporate information, which he has reason to know emanates from a corporate source,
and which by itself places him in a position superior to other investors, thereby acquires a relationship with respect to that information within the purview and restraints of the antifraud provisions.
Id. Thus, in Investors Management, the SEC held that tippees and even
remote tippees could violate rule lOb-5 when they know or have reason to
know that they have received material nonpublic information which was
improperly obtained. Id.
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bility under rule lOb-5 for nondisclosure in Chiarella v. United States.42
In Chiarella, the defendant was employed as a markup man by a
financial printing company.48 As a result of his position, Chiarella
learned of several pending takeover bids while preparing documents for
the acquiring corporations. 44 Chiarella used this informtion by purchasing the stock of five target companies prior to the public announcement of the tender offers and reselling for a substantial profit shortly
after public notice.45 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit found that Chiarella violated section 10(b) and rule
l0b-5,46 stating that "[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly

receives material nonpublic information may not use that information
to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose.
42. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). For a discussion of how the Court narrowed the
scope of nondisclosure liability, see Morrison, Silence is Golden: Trading on
Nonpublic Market Information, 8 SEc. REG. L.J. 211, 211-12 (1980); It Takes A
Thief, supra note 25, at 113; Note, The Standard of Liability Under Rule
lob-5 In Cases of Nondisclosure, 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 99 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Standard of Liability]; Affirmative Duty To Disclose, supra note 25.
The expansion of rule lOb-5 had previously been halted in other areas by the

Supreme Court. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)
(element of scienter is required for a rule lob-5 violation, and simple negligence is not enough); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975) (only purchaser or seller may bring a private action under rule lOb-5
for money damages).
43. 445 U.S. at 224. As an employee of the specialized printing firm, it
was Chiarella's job to take the document from the customer, select the type
fonts and page layouts, and then to pass the manuscript on to be set into
type. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445
U.S. 222 (1980).

44. Id. Although all the documents contained coded names of the offeror
and the target companies, Chiarella's expertise as a knowledgeable trader

enabled him to decipher the code and ascertain the actual names of the companies. Id.
45. Id. This information was "market information," in that it referred

to information about circumstances which affect the market for a company's
securities but which do not affect the company's assets or earning power. 445
U.S. at 231. See Fleisher, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the
Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 799

(1973). Market information is frequently "generated by sources outside the
company whose shares are affected." Id. at 807.
46. 588 F.2d 1358, 1368 (1978).

Chiarella had entered into a consent

decree with the SEC to return his profits to the sellers of the shares he purchased. 445 U.S. at 224. The SEC has obtained consent decrees from other
printers in situations similar to those in Chiarella. See, e.g., SEC v. Manderano,
[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,357 (D.N.J. 1978); SEC
v. Sorg Printing Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,034 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In affirming his conviction, the Second Circuit reemphasized the fact that Congress enacted § 10(b) to prohibit conduct which
destroys the public's confidence in the securities markets. Id. at 1368. The
court noted that § 10(b) was specifically designed to prohibit such manipulative
and deceptive practices and concluded by stating: "It is difficult to imagine
conduct less useful, or more destructive of public confidence in the integrity of
our securities markets, than Chiarella's." Id. at 1369.
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And if he cannot disclose, he must abstain from buying or selling." 47
The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction, 48 noting
that while silence in connection with the purchase or sale of securities
may operate as a fraud actionable under section 10(b), such liability for
nondisclosure is premised upon a duty to disclose which arises from 4 a9
relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction.
The Court held that since Chiarella was not a fiduciary of the selling
shareholders, he had no duty to reveal his knowledge of the impending
takeovers to them, and thus did not violate rule 10b-5. 50
Chief Justice Burger, in his dissenting opinion, opined that any
person who "misappropriates" nonpublic information has an absolute
duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading. 51 The
47. Id. at 1365 (footnote omitted) (emphasis by the court).
48. 445 U.S. at 237. The Court held that the duty to disclose arises only
from a relationship between the parties, and not from the mere "ability to
acquire information because of his position in the market." Id. at 231 n.14.
The Supreme Court concluded that the Second Circuit failed to identify a
relationship between Chiarella and the sellers that gave rise to a duty to
disclose. 445 U.S. at 232. The Second Circuit's decision, the Court stated,
rested solely upon the belief that the federal securities laws created a system
that mandates equal access to information that is necessary to a well-reasoned
and intelligent investment decision. Id. Thus, the court of appeals had
suggested that the use by anyone of material information that is not generally
available to all is fraudulent. Id. The Supreme Court stated that this reasoning suffers from two defects. "First, not every instance of financial unfairness
constitutes fraudulent activity under § 10(b)." Id. "Second, the element required to make silence fraudulent-a duty to disclose-is absent in this case."
Id.
49. Id. at 230.
50. Id. at 232-33. The Supreme Court reasoned that no duty could arise
from Chiarella's relationship with the sellers of the target company's securities
for he had no prior dealings with them. Id. at 232. He was not their agent,
he was not a fiduciary, and he was not a person in whom they placed their
trust. Id.
51. Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger, in his dissenting opinion, stated that as a general rule, neither party to an arm's length
business transaction has an obligation to disclose information to the other
party unless some confidential or fiduciary relation exists. Id. at 239-40

(Burger, C.J., dissenting), citing W.

PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 106 (2d ed. 1955). This permits business people to capitalize on experience
and skill. Id. at 240. However, the Chief Justice reasoned that this general
rule should give way when an informational advantage is obtained not by
superior skill or foresight but by unlawful means. Id. Chief Justice Burger
then noted that one commentator had stated:
[T]he way in which the buyer acquires the information which he
conceals from the vendor should be a material circumstance. The
information. might have been acquired as the result of his bringing
to bear a superior knowledge, intelligence, skill or technical judgment;
it might have been acquired by chance; or it might be acquired by
means of some tortious action on his part .... Any time information
is acquired by an illegal act it would seem that there should be a
duty to disclose that information.
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Chief justice stated that because Chiarella misappropriated information
given to his employer by the offering company and "violated his duty
as an agent to the offeror corporations not to use their confidential in3
formation for personal profit," r2 his conduct violated rule l0b-5.5

Although the majority did not consider Chief Justice Burger's misappropriation theory because it had not been presented to the jury, 4 four
55
other members of the Court indicated their agreement with it.
Therefore, following this decision, the validity of the misappropriation theory
remained an open question, since the Chiarella Court "wisely [left] the
resolution of this issue for another day." 56
Following the Chiarella decision the SEC suggested that the misappropriation theory would be a useful technique for bringing subse-

Id., quoting Keeton, Fraud-Concealmentand Non-Disclosure, 15
1, 25-26 (1936) (emphasis added by Chief justice Burger).

TEx.

L.

REV.

Thus, Chief Justice

Burger stated that he would read § 10(b) and rule lob-5 to "encompass and
build on this principle: to mean that a person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to
refrain from trading." Id. at 240.
52. Id. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), quoting Reply Brief for Petitioner
at 4 (emphasis added by Chief Justice Burger). The Chief Justice stated that
the evidence indicated that Chiarella had "misappropriated-stole to put it
bluntly-valuable nonpublic information entrusted in him in the utmost confidence." Id. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
53. Id. According to Chief Justice Burger, after misappropriating the
information, Chiarella exploited his advantage by purchasing securities in the
market. Id. See Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: "Fairness"
versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAW. 517 (1982).
54. 445 U.S. at 236. The majority concluded that it need not decide
whether this theory had merit because it had not been submitted to the jury,
and therefore, could not be used to affirm the conviction of the defendant. Id.
55. Id. at 238-52. Four Justices suggested a willingness to uphold the
misappropriation theory. See id. at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 240
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 245 (Blackmun & Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Justice
Stevens said:
The Court correctly does not address the second question: whether
the petitioner's breach of his duty of silence-a duty he unquestionably
owed to his employer and to his employer's customers-could give rise
to a criminal liability under Rule lOb-5. Respectable arguments
could be made in support of either position. On the one hand, if we
assume that petitioner breached a duty to the acquiring companies
that had entrusted confidential information to his employers, a
legitimate argument could be made that his actions constituted "a
fraud or a deceit" upon those companies "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security." On the other hand, inasmuch as
those companies would not be able to recover damages from petitioner
for violating Rule lOb-5 because they were neither purchasers nor
sellers of target company securities . . .it could also be argued that
no actionable violation of Rule lob-5 had occurred.
Id., citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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quent Chiarella-type cases within the reach of rule lOb-5. 57 In addition,
in September of 1980, the SEC adopted rule 14e-3 to specifically focus
on the problem of insider trading in connection with tender offers. 58
Rule 14e-3 prohibits trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information '[i]f any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has commenced, a tender offer." 59 The importance of the
57. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17,120 (1980), [1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,646, at 83,456. In this release the Commission states:
As noted, the Chiarella Court did not resolve whether trading while
in possession of material, nonpublic market information misappropriated or obtained or used by unlawful means violates Rule lOb-5.
The Commission continues to believe that such conduct undermines
the integrity of, and investor confidence in, the securities markets, and
that persons who unlawfully obtain or misappropriate material, nonpublic information violate Rule 10b-5 when they trade on such
information.
Id.
58. Id. at 83,453. Rule 14e-3 mandates a "disclose or abstain from trading"
rule for any person who obtains inside information concerning a tender offer
from either the offeror or the target company. See Affirmative Duty To Disclose, supra note 25, at 149.
59. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1981). Rule 14e-3 provides in pertinent part:
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has commenced, a tender offer (the "offering person"), it
shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice
within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act for any other person
who is in possession of material information relating to such tender
offer which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic
and which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly
or indirectly from:
(1) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by
such tender offer, or
(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other
person acting on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to
purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of such
securities or any securities convertible into or exchangeable for
any such securities or any option or right to obtain or to dispose
of any of the foregoing securities, unless within a reasonable time
prior to any purchase or sale such information and its source are
publicly disclosed by press release or otherwise.
Id. See O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [Current] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,443, at 92,622 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In O'Connor, the
board of directors of Amax, Inc. (Amax) made a public announcement that
Standard Oil of California, Inc. (Socal) had made a proposal to acquire an
equity interest in Amax. Id. at 92,623. Simultaneously with the announcement
of the proposal, the Amax board announced its decision to reject the offer. Id.
O'Connor & Associates (O'Connor), trader of stocks and options, had sold call
options on Amax stock. Id. O'Connor brought this action seeking relief
under sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, rules lob-5 and
14e-3 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and under a common law
fraud theory, alleging that insiders at either Socal or Amax or both had tipped
inside information to unknown customers of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. and
A. G. Becker, Inc. and that these tippees had purchased Amax call options
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Chiarella decision, however, is not diminished by the promulgation of
this new rule, since in a tender offer situation, both rule lOb-5 and rule
14e-3 may be applied in fashioning a remedy.6 0 Furthermore, the
Chiarella decision is not limited to the tender offer situation. 61
Against this background, the court in Newman was faced with determining whether the misappropriation theory, as expressed by Chief
Justice Burger in his Chiarella dissent,6 2 could be used to impose criminal liability under rule lOb-5 on persons who allegedly used their positions within investment banking firms to obtain material nonpublic
information and used that information in security trading for personal
profit. 03

The Second Circuit noted that the Supreme Court in Chiarellahad
held there was no fraud where the defendant had no duty to speak, and
since there was no fiduciary relationship between Chiarella and the
sellers of the stock, no duty to disclose was present. 64 However, the
Newman court concluded that this case was different from Chiarella
because in Newman, the Government asserted that the defendants owed
a duty to Morgan, Kuhn Loeb, and their clients, and not to the sellers
of the target companies' stock. 3 The Government asserted that the
defendants violated fiduciary duties of honesty, loyalty, and silence, and
engaged in practices which operated as a fraud on Morgan, Kuhn Loeb,
66
and their clients.
with knowledge of the proposed merger. Id. at 92,623-24. The court concluded that Socal's action constituted a substantial step toward the commencement of a tender offer, and therefore, was within the scope of rule 14e-3.

Id. at 92,629-33.
60. See id. at 92,622. The court concluded that a plaintiff alleging fraud
in connection with a tender offer could obtain relief under both rule lOb-5
and rule 14e-3, since duplicative remedies may be simultaneously pursued
under the securities laws. Id. at 92,632.
61. See 445 U.S. 222 (1980). For a discussion of the Chiarella decision,
see notes 42-50 and accompanying text supra. The Court did not limit its
holding to the tender offer situation, but rather set out in broad language
when an outsider has a duty to disclose information which is generated by
sources outside the issuer. See 445 U.S. 222 (1980). See also note 45 supra;
note 101 infra.
62. See 445 U.S. at 239 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); notes 51-53 and accompanying text supra.
63. 664 F.2d at 16.
64. Id. at 15. See notes 48-50 and accompanying text supra.
65. 664 F.2d at 15-16.
66. Id. The indictment alleged that Courtois and Antoniu breached the
trust and confidence placed in them by their employers and their employer's
clients. Id. The indictment also charged Newman, Carniol, and Spyropoulos
with aiding Courtois and Antoniu in violating the fiduciary duties of honesty,
loyalty, and silence owed to Morgan, Kuhn Loeb, and their clients. Id. at 16.
Furthermore, the indictment charged that Courtois, Newman, and Carniol
engaged in acts which operated as a fraud and deceit on Morgan, Kuhn Loeb,
and clients of these investment banking firms. Id.
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The Newman court stated that in order to come within the purview
of rule 1Ob-5,67 the fraud does not have to be perpetrated upon the pur-

chasers or sellers of the securities.68 The court explained that the fact
that the defrauded parties were Morgan, Kuhn Loeb, and their clients,
and that the securities being purchased were stock in the target companies, would not preclude the applicability of rule 1Ob-5.69 The court
therefore proceeded to examine the conduct alleged in the indictment
more closely to determine if there was in fact a rule 1Ob-5 violation in
70
these circumstances.
The Second Circuit first considered whether Newman's conduct
amounted to fraud and deceit. 71 The court concluded that by sullying
the reputations of Morgan and Kuhn Loeb as safe repositories of client
confidences, Newman and his cohorts defrauded these investment banking firms.72 In addition, the court found that Newman and his companions by their stock purchases had wronged the clients of Morgan and
Kuhn Loeb whose takeover plans were keyed to target company stock
prices fixed by market forces, and not prices artificially inflated through
purchases by "purloiners of confidential information." 7
The court looked next at whether the fraud was in connection with
67. For the text of rule lOb-5, see note 10 supra.
68. 664 F.2d at 16-17. The Second Circuit noted that the language of
rule lOb-5 requires only that the fraud be in connection with a sale or purchase
of a security. Id. at 17. However, the court pointed out that only purchasers
and sellers of securities may bring lOb-5 suits for money damages. Id., citing
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737, 749 (1975). See
also Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952).
69. 664 F.2d at 16-17.
70. Id. at 17-18. Despite the SEC's adoption of rule 14e-3, which specifically
deals with insider trading in connection with tender offers, the present case was
unaffected because the acts covered in the indictment occurred prior to the
promulgation of the rule. Id. at 16 n.3. For a discussion of rule 14e-3, see
notes 57-61 and accompanying text supra.
71. 664 F.2d at 17-18.
72. Id. at 17. The court stated that the wrongdoing charged against
Newman and his cohorts was fraud, and not simple internal corporation mismanagement. Id. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6 (1971). In Bankers Life, Justice Douglas suggested a limit to the broad
"touch" test when he stated that § 10(b) did not seek to regulate transactions
which constitute mere internal corporate mismanagement. Id. at 12. For a
discussion of this "touch" test of Bankers Life, see note 20 supra.
73. 664 F.2d at 17-18. The court noted that in a tender-offer situation,
increased purchases will drive up the price of the stock of the target companies, making the offering companies' offers less attractive. Id. (citation
omitted). The court stated that in other areas of the law, a deceitful misappropriation of confidential information is unlawful. Id. at 18 (citations
omitted). Consequently, as there is no reason to believe that Congress intended to establish a less rigorous standard under the Securities Acts, the same
code of conduct should be used.

Id. (citations omitted).
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the purchase or sale of securities.7 4 It concluded that there was a sufficient connection between the fraud and the purchase to apply rule
lOb-5, since the defendant's sole purpose in misappropriating the confidential takeover information was to purchase shares of the target companies. 75 The Newman court concluded that the defendant's conduct
constituted a criminal violation of rule lOb-5 of which the defendant
had clear notice, despite the fact that neither Morgan, Kuhn Loeb, nor
their clients was at any time a purchaser or seller of the target company
securities in any transaction with any of the defendants. 6
Judge Dumbauld criticized the majority for holding that Newman's
acts were a fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.77 He opined that the Supreme Court's decisions seem to evince a
trend which would confine the scope of section 10(b) to practices harmful to participants in actual purchase-sale transactions. 78 Thus, although the defendants deceptively violated a fiduciary duty to their
employers and customers of their employers, the defrauded parties were
not at that time purchasers or sellers of any target company securities
and no section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5 violation could be found. 79
It is suggested that the Second Circuit in Newman erred in applying the misappropriation theory so without carefully considering its im74. Id.
75. Id. The court relied upon a Supreme Court decision where the
phrase "in connection with" was construed flexibly to include deceptive
practices "touching" the sale of securities. Id., citing Superintendent of Ins.
v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971). For a discussion of Bankers
Life, see note 20 supra.
76. 664 F.2d at 16. The court disposed of the district court's basis for
dismissing the indictment by simply stating "we believe that Rule lOb-5's proscription of fraudulent deceptive practices upon any person in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security provided clear notice to appellee that his
fraudulent conduct was unlawful." Id. at 19. The court also held that the
mail fraud statute was violated and, since both substantive counts were reinstated, the conspiracy charge was also reinstated. Id. at 19-20. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 371, 1341 (1976).
77. 664 F.2d at 20-21 (Dumbauld, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Judge Dumbauld concurred in those parts of the majority opinion
which found that the defendant had violated the mail fraud statute, but dissented from the majority opinion's holding in regard to the securities fraud.
Id. Judge Dumbauld stated that he was "not certain that the deceptive prac-

tice engaged in by defendant and his confederates was a fraud in connection

with the purchase or sale of any security." Id.
78. Id., citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Blue Chip

Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
79. Id.
80. See 664 F.2d at 15-16.

The court held that Newman was engaged in

acts which operated as a fraud on Morgan, Kuhn Loeb, and their clients, and
that this fraud was in connection with the purchase of shares of the target
companies, and therefore, constituted a criminal violation of section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5. Id. at 17-19. For a discussion of the misappropriation theory
introduced by Chief Justice Burger in Chiarella, see notes 51-53 and accompanying text supra.
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pact. By placing a seal of approval on this theory, the court expanded
the scope of rule lOb-5 to impose liability on an outsider who obtains
information from a source outside the corporation whose securities are
being traded. 81 It is submitted that this expansion is inconsistent with
the stance of recent Supreme Court decisions limiting the relief avail82
able under rule 1Ob-5.
In addition, as a result of the court's approval of the misappropriation theory, all nondisclosure violations under rule lOb-5, in the Second
Circuit at least, will be subject to two standards. 83 Liability for corporate insiders and their tippees will be predicated on a fiduciary relationship to the purchasers or sellers of the corporation's stock,84 while on the
other hand, liability for outsiders and their tippees who obtain information from a source outside the corporation will be based upon finding
a breach of an employee's duty through the misappropriation of information. 85 The drawing of a distinction between receiving information
from a source inside the issuer and from a source outside the issuer is
not instrumental in furthering the purpose behind rule lOb-5. 6 If it is
accepted that the antifraud provisions are to protect the investor, then
from the investor's point of view, the only relevant concern is that he
is at an unfair disadvantage when he trades with someone who has inside information. 87 Therefore, it is submitted that the standard of
81. 664 F.2d at 15-19. Newman was not a corporate insider of the target
companies and had no relationship with them. Id. at 15. In addition, he
obtained his information from the acquiring companies and not the target
companies whose securities were being traded. Id. In other words, Newman
was within that category of traders who had no relationship or fiduciary duties
to the issuer corporation or its stockholders, and who received material nonpublic information concerning the issuer from an outside source. See Standard
of Liability, supra note 42, at 119. Liability for this category of traders is
predicated upon finding a breach of the duty of an employee through the
misappropriation of information. Id. For a discussion of trading on "market
information", see note 45 supra.
82. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (no duty to
disclose arises if there is no relationship of trust between the parties); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (element of scienter is required for a
lob-5 violation; simple negligence is not enough); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (only actual purchaser or seller of securities
may bring a private action for money damages under rule lOb-5). See note
42 and accompanying text supra.
83. See Standard of Liability, supra note 42, at 119.
84. See id. See also Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio
1959), afl'd per curiarn, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960).
85. See Standard of Liability, supra note 42, at 119. See also United
States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (1981).
86. For a discussion of the purpose behind rule lOb-5, see note 19 and
accompanying text supra.
87. See United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1365 n.8. The Second
Circuit in Chiarella stated that "from the point of view of a shareholder who
sells his stock on the day before the price jumps sharply upward, it matters
little whether the cause of the rise was news of an ore strike . . . or, as here,
the announcement of a tender offer." Id.
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liability should be the same regardless of whether the inside information
comes from an inside source or a source outside the issuer.
It is submitted that in applying the misappropriation theory, the
Newman court read rule lOb-5 as containing two unrelated elements.
First, that the defendant's activity must amount to a fraud,8 8 and
second, that the activity be in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security.89 The problem with this interpretation is that the absence
of a nexus requirement between the fraud and the purchase of the
security allows the court to find a 1Ob-5 violation whenever it can make
some connection between these elements, no matter how tenuous. 90
The Newman court relies on the Supreme Court's decision in
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.91 to support
the proposition that for a lOb-5 violation, the deceptive practices need
only "touch" the sale of securities. 92 While it is agreed that Bankers
Life did flexibly construe the "in connection with" requirement of rule
lOb-5, a careful reading of the decision indicates that the fraud must
result from deceptive practices "touching" the purchase or sale of securities of the defrauded party.93
Prior to the raising of the misappropriation theory in Chiarella
and Newman, in all cases finding lOb-5 liability, the defrauded party
was also the purchaser or seller of the securities, 94 and therefore, the
question of whether Bankers Life required such symmetry never arose.
However, since the misappropriation theory now makes it possible for
the defrauded party to be different from the purchaser or seller of the
securities, 9 it is necessary to reread Bankers Life with this problem in
mind. It is submitted that a careful reading will show that the test
adopted in Bankers Life requires the defrauded party to also be the
88. See 664 F.2d at 17-18. See notes 71-73 and accompanying text supra.
89. See 664 F.2d at 18. See notes 74-75 and accompanying text supra.
90. See 664 F.2d at 17-18. The connection in Newman was based on the
fact that information received as a result of a fraud on one corporation, was
used to purchase securities of other corporations. Id. More specifically,
Courtois and Antoniu defrauded their employers and their clients, and then
gave information to Newman, who acting on this information, purchased stock
in corporations who were the targets of proposed mergers. Id. at 15.
91. 404 U.S. 6 (1971). For a discussion of Bankers Life, see note 20 supra.
92. 664 F.2d at 18. For a discussion of Bankers Life and interpretations
in the Courts of Appeals, see note 20 supra.
93. See 404 U.S. at 12-13. In Bankers Life there was an act which operated
as a fraud on Manhattan Casualty Co., and it was alleged that this fraud was
in connection with the sale of Manhattan's securities. Id. at 9-13. Therefore,
the Court in Bankers Life was faced with a situation where the defrauded
party was also the seller of securities. Id.
94. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (sellers of Texas Gulf Sulphur stock
were the defrauded parties); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)
(purchasers of Curtiss-Wright stock were the defrauded parties). For a discussion of these cases, see notes 27-41 and accompanying text supra.
95. See 664 F.2d at 16; note 90 and accompanying text supra.
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purchaser or seller of securities, and therefore, the misappropriation
theory should not be used to sustain a rule 1Ob-5 violation.96
It is suggested that the misappropriation theory is unnecessary and
that any problem caused by declaring it invalid can easily be solved.
The apparent concern is that without the misappropriation theory,
many defendants such as Newman and Chiarella, would go unpunished. 97
This belief is unfounded now that the SEC has adopted rule 14e-3 to
specifically deal with insider trading in connection with tender offers.98
At the present time, rule 14e-3 and rule lOb-5 are both being applied
to supply duplicate sanctions for the same conduct.99 It is suggested
that there is no reason for such duplication, and the better approach is
to limit rule lOb-5 to situations where the defrauded party is the purchaser or seller of the securities.10° In all other situations where there
96. See notes 93 & 95 and accompanying text supra. Despite the proposed blanket rejection of the misappropriation theory, it is arguable that the
theory can be limited to a tender offer situation consistently with the Bankers
Life decision. The reason is that in a tender offer situation, fraud on the
acquiring corporation may be considered a fraud on the target company since
the information really is being misappropriated not from one corporation,
but, rather, from a transaction involving both corporations. See United
States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,024,
at 91,296. The district court insinuated that the defendants committed fraud
upon both the acquiring and the target companies. Id. Therefore, in a
tender offer situation, the misappropriation theory could be used since in
actuality the defrauded party and the issuer of securities is the target company.
See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
97. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Without the use
of the misappropriation theory, the Chiarella Court found that Chiarella was
not liable under rule lOb-5. Id. For a discussion of Chiarella, see notes 42-56
and accompanying text supra. See also Standard of Liability, supra note 42,
at 119. The Chiarella decision created the possibility of anomalous results, as
a printer such as Chiarella did not have a duty to disclose prior to trading in
the securities because he obtained information from an outside source, and
therefore had no fiduciary duty to the sellers of the target companies' stock,
whereas a printer who received the information from the target company would
have a duty to disclose. Id. However, the misappropriation theory eliminates
this problem by forbidding both of these printers from trading prior to disclosure. Id.
98. For a discussion of rule 14e-3, see notes 58-59 and accompanying text
supra.
99. O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [Current] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
98,443, at 92,622 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). See note 60 and
accompanying text supra.
100. See notes 93-94 and accompanying text supra; United States v.
Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,024, at 91,296.
The district court stated that "[w]hile the indictment does charge that defendants committed fraud upon, inter alia, the investment banks' corporate
clients (including, in these instances, target companies), it is not a fraud
perpetrated upon the companies as purchasers or sellers of securities, a
requisite element under the securities laws." Id. See also Heller, supra note
53, at 537. The defendants in Chiarella asserted the argument suggested by
Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion, that rule lOb-5 applied solely to a
fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security perpetrated upon
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is a need for some regulation, 1°1 instead of invoking the misappropriation theory, it should be left for Congress to supply the regulation.
The misappropriation theory is burdened with many problems and
inconsistencies. 102 However, because the theory makes it easier to prove
liability, the approval of the misappropriation theory is likely to result
in increased prosecutions for insider trading.103 Further, the type of
conduct which the theory was developed to control could be, and in fact
now is, regulated by other means. 04 It is therefore submitted that if
considered by the Supreme Court, it should be rejected as an unwarranted expansion of rule l0b-5. 0
Paul M. Altman
the immediate buyer or seller involved in the transaction. Id. at 537-38. For
a discussion of Justice Steven's concurring opinion in Chiarella, see note 56
and accompanying text supra.
101. An example of the type of non-tender offer cases that rule lob-5
should not be extended to cover is the situation where a judge's law clerk or
a financial columnist acquires information as a result of his position of employment concerning a business transaction to take place in the future, and prior
to disclosing it to the public he purchases or sells stock in one of the corporations involved.
102. See notes 80-96 and accompanying text supra.
103. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
104. See notes 97-98 and accompanying text supra.
105. See notes 81-82 and accompanying text supra.
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